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Table 6 Heterogeneity in effects of ITC: regarding taxpayer’s affiliation

From: Tax incentives and environmental protection: evidence from China’s taxpayer-level data

Dependent variable: weighted growth in Eq. (2)

Subsample E of benchmark sample

Subsample F of benchmark sample

Subsample A of full sample

Subsample B of full sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Independent variables

Coal inputs

Net investment

Coal inputs

Net investment

Coal inputs

Coal inputs

Part A

 Lagged ITCdummy

−7.614** (3.738)

−3.951*** (1.220)

1.659** (0.629)

0.099 (0.835)

−0.172 (1.223)

−0.252 (0.980)

 Taxpayer-level control variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Industry-level control variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Taxpayer fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Year fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Province and province-year fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 within R-square

0.795

0.702

0.180

0.174

0.225

0.209

 Observation

144

201

3048

3693

799

1198

Part B

 Lagged ITCterm

81.460*** (14.892)

2.897*** (1.044)

−2.167 (1.433)

−2.572* (1.547)

17.988** (7.592)

16.433** (7.901)

 Taxpayer-level control variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Industry-level control variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Taxpayer fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Year fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Province and province-year fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

 Within R-square

0.859

0.925

0.193

0.180

0.109

0.095

 Observation

126

178

2998

3645

724

1067

  1. Notes: Superscript symbols "*, **, and ***" represent 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % significant level respectively. The coefficients in Italics should be emphasized for they indicate that ITC constrains coal consumption of firms affiliated to the central government. Columns 1–2 use subsample E of the benchmark sample or firms attached to the central government in the benchmark sample, while columns 3–4 use subsample F of the benchmark sample, that is, those attached to subnational governments including provinces, prefectures and counties in the benchmark sample. Column 5 uses subsample A of the full sample, that is, incumbents or existing firms affiliated to the central government in the full sample. Column 6 uses subsample B of the full sample or firms affiliated to the central government in the full sample. We do not report the results for TID due to lack of TID-related observations. We try controlling industry and industry-year fixed effects instead of province and province-year ones and find the results are similar to those in this table. We also try estimations on other dependent variables like net capital stock, employment, fuel inputs, output, and value added and find no significant differences in the results between the two subsamples. For other notes, see Table 5